ReadingAnimals

For the last couple of weeks there has been buzz about a decision by Spain’s parliament to extend certain protections to (nonhuman) great apes. There have been vocal critics and proponents. Others wonder what it means for humans and for animals other than apes in Spain and, indeed, globally.

Without a doubt, the proposed law has big implications. In a new column published today, When Human Rights Extend to Nonhumans, Don McNeil, Jr. notes some of the issues:

What’s intriguing about the committee’s action is that it juxtaposes two sliding scales that are normally not allowed to slide against each other: how much kinship humans feel for which animals, and just which “human rights” each human deserves.

We like to think of these as absolutes: that there are distinct lines between humans and
animals, and that certain “human” rights are unalienable. But we’re kidding ourselves.

What’s for sure is that we are not in an either/or dilemma: We can care about both human rights and the rights of other great apes (and other animals). It’s not the case that there’s only enough compassion for one or the other. In many ways, the pending legislation says “There are even fewer reasons to deny an individual life and liberty. Today, we say that this tiny genetic distinction cannot be used as license to torture and kill.” In this case, it’s the distinction between humans and other apes. But it’s not so unlike the many other cases in history where differences have been used to justify deprivation, abuse and murder.

Another author writing about similarity, genes and protection at the Practical Ethics blog, Rebecca Roache, touched on this very issue recently when asking whether, “… ‘genes for’ improve the way we treat animals?”

Delineating moral status along species lines may be convenient, but it is crude. It encourages the view that all humans have equal needs, and that it is acceptable to treat non-human animals in ways that we would never treat even those humans of comparable sentience and cognitive abilities.

For Roache, scientific advances in genetics offer a new perspective on the speciesist (and specious) arguments that have long been logically and ethically dissatisfying:

Focusing on genetic similarities and differences between individuals could greatly improve society’s abilities to meet the needs of those individuals, whether or not they are human. Ethically, this would be a huge step forward both for humans and other animals.

Some other critics have bemoaned the fact that the law only serves to move the so-called “bright line” that separates humans from other animals to a different place - from the genus* where humans differ from other great apes to some other taxonomic position.  In the end, though, it’s not reasoning I would use to deny this specific subset of individuals the most basic and minimal protections afforded them under the proposed law.  It certainly deserves careful examination - there are many individuals suffering in a myriad of ways in places all over the world.

Consider some hypothetical case where advocates were asking for protections of a certain group of prisoners or a very specific group of individuals who were suffering.  Perhaps they are held unjustly.  Perhaps they have been marginalized and exploited for a long time.  If a subset of them could be afforded some important protection, would we deny them that because we could not simultaneously provide it for  others in similar or even worse situations?  Or would we find a way to do the small good that we could achieve in that moment?  What would that small good be?  Perhaps with hostages we ask that captors release the wounded or frail.  For those imprisoned, we may simply be able to negotiate that some prisoners are moved to a modestly improved facility, even though others are left behind.

These are troubling scenarios, but reasonable analogies to the one under consideration in Spain.  The law is only a benefit to great apes in Spain, no where else.  It’s only for great apes, and no other kind of primate or animal.  For some, the law would only result in improved zoo conditions, but with a guarantee of protections from torture and killing.  The change is small, but in the right direction.  And so we take that one step, knowing full well that there is a long journey ahead.

*odd that the distnctions aren’t actually at the taxonomic level of the species, but that the term is “speciesism.”  I suppose it sounds better than subfamily-ism etc.